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In June 1972, Chile’s democratically elected leader, Salvador 
Allende, hired the British cyberneticist, Stafford Beer, to bring 
Chile into the computer age.1 Beer proposed “Project Cyberfolk,” 
a cybernetic system that would further popular participation and 
democracy by allowing citizens to communicate their feelings di-
rectly to the government.2 Beer built a device that would allow citi-
zens to adjust a pointer on a voltmeter-like dial in order to indicate 
moods ranging from extreme unhappiness to complete bliss.3 The 
                                                                                                                            
1 Evgeny Morozov, The Planning Machine Project Cybersyn and the Origins of the Big 
Data Nation, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/10/13/planning-machine. 
2 “Project Cyberfolk consisted of a relatively simple technological system that would 
function within a complex social system with the aim of improving its management …. 
Beer proposed building several [algedonic] meters and using them to conduct 
experiments on how technology could further popular participation and democracy.” See 
EDEN MEDINA, CYBERNETIC REVOLUTIONARIES: TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN 
ALLENDE’S CHILE 81–92 (2011). 
3 Morozov, supra note 1. 
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device would record a citizen’s happiness—ideally during a live 
television broadcast featuring some proposed new political poli-
cy—and electronically send the data directly to the government for 
real-time aggregation and review.4 Beer theorized that his system 
would improve public well-being and bring homeostatic stability 
between government and constituent.5 
Beer’s dream would not be realized.6 However, despite his op-
timism, it is easy to see how such a device could be misused by the 
government or partisan groups.7 In particular, the stark data-
asymmetry between constituent and government places all the 
power of data in the hands of the government without transparency 
and accountability to the citizens producing the data. Citizens 
would be unable to know how their data is processed or aggregated, 
nor would the government be obligated to reveal what a citizen’s 
data reveals compared to historical trends. The data could even be 
used to identify and persecute political dissidents based on the 
views born out of their data. Beer did anticipate these problems, 
and he designed safeguards into the system in order to foster visi-
bility and transparency and ensure the process remained analog to 
keep a citizen’s meter anonymous.8 
Today, political consultants, technologists, and entrepreneurs 
are all helping American politicians effect even larger data-
asymmetries by gathering data on citizens through more advanced 
tools of monitoring and persuasion, and with even fewer safe-
guards. With these data services,9 campaigns have access to mas-
sive electronic databases containing information gleaned and pur-
chased from public and private sources on nearly every voter in the 
                                                                                                                            
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 “Beer commissioned several prototype meters and used them in small group 
experiments. They were never implemented as the form of real-time, adaptive political 
communication that Beer imagined.” MEDINA, supra note 2, at 92. 
7 “Despite Beer’s good intentions, it is easy to imagine how a government might 
abuse such a device or how partisan groups might manipulate them to suit their 
interests.” Id. at 91. 
8 “Beer recognized that the meters, like the telephone voting systems already in 
existence at the time, brought with them the potential for political oppression … [He] 
insisted that the devices be analog, not digital, which would make it more difficult to 
identify individual meters and, by extension, individual users.” Id. 
9 See infra Parts I.A–C. 
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United States.10 The public data, in part, is composed of lists of 
registered voters and can be obtained from official voter lists and 
records maintained by states.11 The private data is more emblemat-
ic of “Big Data,” encompassing a galaxy of information purchased 
from data brokers and revealing a limitless range of consumer ha-
bits including magazine subscription records, credit histories, and 
even grocery “club card” purchases.12 With all this data, cam-
paigns can use powerful analytic tools to distill myriad disjointed 
and seemingly innocuous data points into an individualized voter 
profile that reveals intimate details about a voter’s life and beha-
vior.13 These profiles allow campaigns to craft messages individual-
ly tailored to a voter’s attitudes or ideology as well as economize 
campaign resources by focusing only on “persuadables.”14 
Most citizens, as they engage in their roles as consumers and 
voters, do not appreciate the degree to which their data is freely 
traded in data markets. As a matter of law, when an individual free-
ly discloses their data to a third party, online or offline, there is no 
reasonable expectation that the data can be kept private15 (barring 
certain types of data protected by federal statute).16 Very few 
people are aware that their data is being shipped off and aggregated 
in data warehouses where it is organized, stored, and analyzed.17 
This is partly due to the passive role users play in micro-targeting 
practices, which for the most part are surreptitious by design. For 
                                                                                                                            
10 Chris Evans, It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the 
Information Age, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 867, 867–68 (2012). 
11 See infra Part I.C. 
12 “An everyday example of data gathering occurs at supermarkets, which use 
information they obtain from customer loyalty cards to send consumers targeted coupons 
and advertisements.” Preston N. Thomas, Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case for a Right of 
Audit in Private Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 158 (2009); see also Daniel 
Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political Data, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 70, 71 (2012). 
13 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all. 
14 See Kreiss, supra note 12. 
15 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 (2006) 
(explaining the third-party doctrine); see also Evans, supra note 10, at 879 (“The parties to 
a financial transaction are said to equally own the facts to the transaction.”). 
16 See Evans, supra note 10. 
17 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 121 
(2004). 
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example, a practice known as “cookie matching” allows marketers 
to serve advertising to users based on data aggregated by actors not 
present at the initial transaction that generated the data.18 Given 
the surreptitious and unexpected nature of micro-targeting trends 
like cookie matching and more,19 voters lack the notice necessary to 
exercise autonomy over their data held in the private databases of 
political data companies. With more autonomy, voters can minim-
ize privacy and democracy harms associated with political data 
practices, like the data’s capacity to socially engineer voters in un-
fair or impermissible ways,20 the potential political chilling effect 
caused by unaccountable, imperceptible, and pervasive surveil-
lance,21 and the power imbalances perpetuated by unregulated 
“black box” algorithms.22 
All of this matters because political campaigns are increasingly 
interacting with voters based on data and shaping the nature of that 
interaction based on what the data reveals.23 Much of this data is 
proprietary and unregulated,24 which prevents voters from know-
ing what their would-be elected officials know about them or how 
they have used their data to surreptitiously influence and persuade 
them. Without knowledge of or autonomy over data, voters are in-
creasingly at the mercy of a “one-way mirror”25 that scrutinizes 
intimate details about their lives, judges them on that basis, and 
surreptitiously influences their behavior. Given the essential role 
the right to vote plays in ensuring our government serves its 
people, it is necessary to understand the ways in which a loss of in-
formational autonomy can harm voters when they exercise that es-
sential right, and explore ways to mitigate that harm. 
This Note will argue that, when voters lose informational au-
tonomy, democratic harms can result. It will examine the legal ba-
                                                                                                                            
18 Evans, supra note 10, at 879. 
19 See infra Part I.C. 
20 See infra Part II.C. 
21 Id. 
22 See infra Part II.C.3. 
23 See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, How Big Data Sucked the Soul Out of Democratic Politics, THE 
WEEK (Nov. 6, 2014) http://theweek.com/article/index/271411/how-big-data-sucked-
the-soul-out-of-democratic-politics. 
24 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3, 193 (2015). 
25 I borrow the term “one-way mirror” from Frank Pasquale. Id. at 9. 
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sis for federal and state regulation and will discuss legislative or 
regulatory options at the federal and state level. Part I will provide 
additional context about political data practices, describe the or-
ganizations that track it, and examine where the data comes from. 
Part II will discuss the theoretical underpinnings behind informa-
tional autonomy and discuss the various ways Big Data political 
trackers can harm normative conceptions of privacy and democra-
cy. Part III will discuss challenges to reforming political data prac-
tices and explain why regulation is necessary. Part IV will examine 
various federal and state regulatory reforms and provide a legal ba-
sis for federal and state regulation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Computational Politics 
Given the promise of effective insights into voter behavior, it is 
no wonder that campaigns are availing themselves of larger and 
more diverse datasets. A famous example of this trend is the Ob-
ama campaign’s Facebook app, “Obama 2012 - Are You In?” At 
the height of the campaign the app boasted 23 million unique users. 
Each user gave up personal information like his or her name, gend-
er, birthday, current city, religion, and political views as well as 
shared their list of friends, the information they shared with 
friends, and the information those friends shared on Facebook.26 
The data was used to improve voter communication in every facet 
of the campaign, from individually crafted online display advertis-
ing to personalized appeals used for offline get-out-the-vote 
(GOTV) operations like signing up volunteers, knocking on doors, 
phone banking, and identifying likely voters.27 With so much data 
the campaign was able to engage previously untapped voters and 
expand Democratic political participation.28 
                                                                                                                            
26 Micah Sifry, How Obama’s Data-Crunching Prowess May Get Him Re-Elected, CNN 
(Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/09/tech/innovation/obama-data-crunch
ing-election/. 
27 Id. 
28 Kreiss, supra note 12, at 74; John McCormick, Democrats Keep Voter Registration 
Lead in 4 Key States, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-10-10/democrats-keep-voter-registration-lead-in-4-battleground-states.html. 
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A more recent example would be the Koch Brothers-backed po-
litical data firm, i360.29 i360 has spent 50 million dollars to link lists 
of registered voters with consumer data purchased from credit bu-
reaus, information from social networks, estimated income, recent 
addresses, voter history, the brand of car a voter drives, and his or 
her TV viewing habits.30 This was in order to help campaigns tar-
get ads more precisely and cost effectively.31 A number of Republi-
can Senate and gubernatorial candidates that were victorious dur-
ing the 2014 elections count themselves among i360’s clients, in-
cluding Tom Cotton, Joni Ernst, and Larry Hogan.32 
Indeed, electronically stored data used for political purposes is 
nothing new. Political parties have for decades legally maintained 
membership lists and voter management databases used in every 
facet of a campaign, including fundraising, GOTV operations, re-
cruitment of volunteers, and the tracking of issues across key geo-
graphic and demographic constituencies.33 It should also come as 
no surprise that political campaigns are in the advertising and mar-
keting business and that the ties between consumer data brokers,34 
parties, and campaigns run deep.35 Even Acxiom, the country’s 
largest consumer data broker, began in 1969 as a data processing 
                                                                                                                            
29 I360, http://www.i-360.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 




33 Colin Bennett, The Politics of Privacy and the Privacy of Politics: Parties, Elections and 
Voter Surveillance in Western Democracies, 18(8) FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 5, 2013), available 
at http://uncommonculture.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4789/3730. 
34 “Data brokers are companies that collect information, including personal 
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling 
such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an 
individual’s identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial 
fraud.” FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (Mar. 
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
35 “We also know that U.S. parties make extensive use of commercial marketing 
databases. Thus the political data on party affiliation and behavior is combined with other 
data on activities, interests and purchasing habits available from data brokerage firms such 
as Acxiom, Dun and Bradstreet, InfoUSA and aristotle.com.” Bennett, supra note 33. 
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company for the Democratic party.36 What has changed in recent 
years is that campaigns are now utilizing advancements in data 
tracking and storage to find novel ways to combine diverse digital 
datasets and use statistics and other data mining techniques to ex-
tract hidden information and surprising correlations.37 This trend 
was precipitated by the exponential decrease in the cost for storing, 
managing, and analyzing large diverse sets of data.38 
This phenomenon is called “computational politics,” and it re-
fers to the application of computational methods to large datasets 
derived from online and offline data sources for conducting out-
reach, persuasion, and mobilization in the service of electing, fur-
thering, or opposing a candidate, policy, or legislation.39 For exam-
ple, as a forerunner in this area,40 the 2012 Obama campaign devel-
oped a “likelihood of turnout” index based on public and private 
datasets including consumer data on a massive nationwide scale.41 
The index was a number generated between 0 (not going to vote) 
to 100 (will certainly vote) for each potential voter.42 This number 
was appended to every voter, and served as a simple and efficient 
heuristic for campaign staffers to target the right voters at the right 
time in their online and offline GOTV efforts.43 The index also al-
lowed the campaign to dive deep into parts of the country thought 
                                                                                                                            
36 Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-cons
umer-database-marketing.html. 
37 “Big Data … may be understood as a more powerful form of data mining that relies 
on huge volumes of data, faster computers, and new analytic techniques to discover 
hidden and surprising correlations.” Ira S. Rubenstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a 
New Beginning?, 3 INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 74 (2013). 
38 David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data 2 (Harvard 
Kennedy Sch. Working Paper Series, No. RWP13-045, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354474. 
39 Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational 
Politics, 19(7) FIRST MONDAY (July 7, 2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/
fm.v19i7.4901. 
40 Sasha Issenberg, How President Obama’s Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Individual 
Voters, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/
featuredstory/509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-voters/. 
41 Tufekci, supra note 39. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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to be Republican enclaves, and pick off individual voters never be-
fore targeted by Democrats.44 
B. Political Data Firms 
A popular narrative after the 2012 elections was that Demo-
crats won the election with good data,45 and the GOP lost because 
of bad data.46 In the intervening years there has been a land rush of 
partisan and non-partisan political firms incorporating sophisti-
cated voter data services into their suite of campaign products.47 
Products like mobile applications allow canvassers to access data in 
real time and generate relevant lists for telephone marketing, email 
marketing, and door-to-door canvassing.48 These firms develop 
these products in order to vie for the business of campaigns and 
candidates. Because these firms are proprietary about their data 
and computational practices, it is difficult to know how much they 
really know about American voters beyond what they choose to re-
veal in press releases and promotional material. However, what 
                                                                                                                            
44 Id. 
45 See Issenberg supra note 40; Dan Balz, How the Obama Campaign Won the Race for 
Voter Data, WASH. POST, July, 28 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-
the-obama-campaign-won-the-race-for-voter-data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-ee4e-11e2-a1f9-
ea873b7e0424_story.html; Andrew Lampitt, The Real Story of How Big Data Analytics 
Helped Obama Win, INFOWORLD (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/
2613587/big-data/the-real-story-of-how-big-data-analytics-helped-obama-win.html. 
46 The Republican party voiced concerns about their 2012 data operations in the so-
called “GOP Autopsy Report,” stating: “To win campaigns, the GOP needs better data, 
better access to data, and better tools to make the most of that data. Although the RNC 
has always made significant investment in data, there is significant remaining work to do 
to ensure that our data is the best it can be.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., GROWTH & 
OPPORTUNITY PROJECT 28 (2013), available at http://growthopp.gop.com/
RNC_Growth_Opportunity_Book_2013.pdf; see also Kenneth P. Vogel & Maggie 
Haberman, Karl Rove, Koch Brothers Lead Charge to Control Republican Data, POLITICO 
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/karl-rove-koch-brothers-
control-republican-data-90385.html. 
47 NGP VAN is a progressive service offering Data Analytics, Voter File Management, 
Volunteer Management, RoboCalls, and RoboSurveys. See NGP VAN, 
http://www.ngpvan.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). NationBuilder is a non-partisan 
campaign platform that offers voter data, website management, and campaign finance 
compliance services. See NATIONBUILDER, http://nationbuilder.com/ (last visited Dec. 
19, 2014); VoterGravity is a conservative service that offers mobile apps for door-to-door 
canvassing, phone banking software, and preloaded voter files. See Features, VOTER 
GRAVITY, http://votergravity.com/features/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
48 See Bennett, supra note 33. 
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little is known still paints a picture of widespread and pervasive 
voter tracking across a diverse set of data. 
i360, rVotes, and Voter Gravity are three notable conservative-
facing companies that offer campaign software and voter data ser-
vices. According to its website, i360 operates a database of “190+ 
million active voters and 250+ million U.S. consumers” and can 
offer a campaign “hundreds of data points on every American adult 
that is currently or potentially politically active.”49 rVotes boasts a 
“Unified Voter Database” that contains a “voters’ position on the 
issues, their voting history [and] their current contact informa-
tion.”50 Voter Gravity offers an “Integrated Solution” that “inte-
grates mobile technology and a web-based phone system through 
one interface” with “an extensive database of every U.S. voter 
with key data points, real time access to data collected and a user-
friendly dashboard that helps you turn information into votes.”51 
NGP VAN and Catalist are well known as the de facto data ser-
vices for Democrats.52 NGP VAN offers field campaign software 
and voter files used by the Obama campaign, with accurate 50-state 
voter files appended with sets of consumer data for “the most so-
phisticated targeting.”53 Catalist offers data analytics that give 
campaigns insight into voters “such as relative likelihood to turn 
out to vote [and] likelihood to be married or have a college degree, 
to name just a few.”54 
As for nonpartisan firms, Aristotle Inc. has proven to be one of 
the most dominant.55 According to its website, Aristotle “provides 
                                                                                                                            
49 I360, http://www.i-360.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
50 RVOTES, http://www.rvotes.com/?p=931 (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
51 Features, VOTER GRAVITY, http://votergravity.com/features/ (last visited Dec. 19, 
2014). 
52 “Democrats built their voter data advantage partly because their data is more 
centralized. A few well-connected firms like Catalist and NGP VAN have earned de facto 
endorsements from the Democratic establishment and used those blessings to build near 
monopolies on the left. As a result, Democratic candidates and liberal interest groups 
have benefited from enhancing and sharing the same data through the same interfaces.” 
See Vogel & Haberman, supra note 46. 
53 SmartVAN, NGP VAN, http://www.ngpvan.com/smartvan (last visited Dec. 19, 
2014). 
54 Products, CATALIST, http://www.catalist.us/product (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
55 “[M]ost … candidates employ some data-mining firm that learned its business in 
part from Aristotle, which has served as a consultant for every president since Ronald 
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high-quality political data for political organizations, campaigns, 
consultants and governmental agencies worldwide.”56 Aristotle has 
an ever-growing database of more than 190 million voters. Its CEO 
John Phillips touts the more than 500 attributes his company tracks 
on each voter—“such as interests and charitable causes, educa-
tional level, homeowner/renter, estimated income or presence of 
children in the household.”57 
All of these firms operate on a longstanding principle of cam-
paigning: identify and mobilize voters that are likely to vote for 
your candidate, and avoid wasting time on the rest.58 Increasingly, 
campaigns are using political data firms in order to harness massive 
datasets of information on individual voters in order to micro-
target on the individual level. In the past, campaigns had to rely on 
demographic proxies for persuadability like “race, union member-
ship, residential geography, and voter registration” information.59 
Now, services like Aristotle can dive deeper and sort voters by uti-
lizing hundreds of data points that help boost the signal of individ-
ual “persuadables” submerged in larger demographic groups.60 
Instead of simply targeting “women voters” or “minority voters,” 
campaigns have enough data to accurately profile the libertarian 
white male in Cobb County, Georgia, or the socially conservative 
                                                                                                                            
Reagan .… In the 2006 elections, Aristotle sold information to more than 200 candidates 
for the House of Representatives (even its Republicans had an astounding win record), a 
good portion of those running for Senate, and candidates for governor from California to 
Florida, to New York.” James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR, Dec. 13, 2007, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/12/aristotle200712. 
56 Accurate and Up-To-Date Voter Lists Covering U.S. and Abroad, ARISTOTLE, 
http://aristotle.com/political-data/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
57 David Zax, Football Fans Vote Republican: Hardcore Data Miners Track ‘Neo Tribes’ 
with ‘Micro-Targeting,’ FAST COMPANY (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1807087/football-fans-vote-republican-hardcore-data-miners-track-neo-tribes-micro-
targeting. 
58 “The goal of mining for data is not to figure out who is important in your district. It 
is actually about figuring who not to spend any time with. The major source of waste in a 
political campaign is to try to communicate with people you know are not going to vote 
for you.” Philip Howard & Kris Erickson, Data Collection and Leakage, 84 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 737, 738 (2010); It is a tactic common among all marketers—political or otherwise—
to identify individuals as a “targets” or “waste.” See Joseph Turow, THE DAILY YOU 7 
(2011). 
59 Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for 
Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1078 (2005). 
60 Id. 
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African-American in Chicago, and tailor a campaign message di-
rectly to them.61 
C. The Sources of Data 
Computational politics requires accurate and current lists of 
registered voters from each state’s voter database. States are man-
dated under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to maintain 
state-wide computerized voter registration databases, along with 
uniform procedures for processing registration data.62 When citi-
zens register to vote, most registration forms require a name, ad-
dress, birth date, phone number, and party affiliation, among other 
things.63 Publicly available records of individual voting history are 
also maintained by states.64 State “sunshine”65 laws mandate dis-
closure of most public records barring exemptions similar to the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).66 As a result, states—as a 
matter of course—sell voter records and registration lists to politi-
cal parties and candidates as well as non-partisan political data 
firms.67 
                                                                                                                            
61 Id. 
62 SASHA ISSENBERG, THE VICTORY LAB 245 (2012). 
63 Kim Zetter, Mining the Vein of Voter Rolls, WIRED (DEC. 11, 2003), 
http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2003/12/61507. “All states require 
voters to provide their name, address and signature; Every state but one requires voters to 
provide their date of birth; 46 states ask voters to provide their phone number; 34 states 
ask voters to declare their gender; 30 states ask voters to provide all or part of their Social 
Security number; 27 states require voters to select a party affiliation; 14 states ask voters 
to provide their place of birth; Eleven states ask voters for their drivers’ license number; 
Nine states ask voters to declare their race; Four states ask voters if they need special 
assistance at the polls; Three states require voters to provide a parent’s name; Two states 
ask voters to provide an email address; One state, Arizona, requires voters to state their 
occupation.” CAL. VOTER FOUND., VOTER PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (June 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.calvoter.org/issues/votprivacy/pub/voterprivacy/keyfind
ings.html. 
64 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002). 
65 Id. at 1160. 
66 Id. at 1163. 
67 See Zetter, supra note 63. “Voter data is widely disseminated to secondary users, 
including commercial interests in 22 states, typically without any notice to voters that 
their information will be shared: All states grant candidates and political parties access to 
voter lists; 43 states use voter lists as a juror source list; 22 states allow unrestricted 
access to voter lists, which permits the lists to be used for commercial purposes; Four 
states grant scholars and academics access to voter lists under state statutes; Four states 
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Demographic data from the U.S. Census is another form of da-
ta that has been used in political micro-targeting for a very long 
time.68 Starting in 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau began releasing 
more granular demographic information about race, ethnicity, age, 
and family type at the level of city blocks.69 The data typically in-
cludes 800 households, in three dozen demographic categories—
each attached to a nine-digit ZIP code.70 
Data is also acquired from voters directly by parties and cam-
paigns through a variety of online and offline sources. For example, 
a campaign’s website requires voters to volunteer personal infor-
mation whenever they sign up to volunteer, receive campaign 
communications, or donate. Facebook apps,71 until recently,72 have 
also proven to be a valuable source for campaigns to track users and 
their friends.73 Campaigns also maintain records of offline engage-
ment at rallies and volunteer events, all typically recorded by can-
vassers,74 and they receive data from political parties, who maintain 
their own set of data collected over a longer period of time, which 
typically includes donor data, voter history, attendance at party 
events, data on volunteers, and information collected by canvass-
ers.75 Campaigns are also utilizing data received from online track-
ing cookies76 that monitor a voter’s web traffic.77 When working in 
                                                                                                                            
grant journalists access to voter lists under state statutes.” See CAL. VOTER FOUND., 
supra note 63. 
68 See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 42. 
69 Id. at 59. 
70 Id. at 59. 
71 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES USE THE WEB AND 
SOCIAL MEDIA (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.journalism.org/2012/08/15/
how-presidential-candidates-use-web-and-social-media/. 
72 Luke Shuman, A Facebook Change Makes It Harder for Political Campaigns to See Your 
Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/upshot/a-
facebook-change-makes-it-harder-for-political-campaigns-to-see-your-friends.html?ref
=politics&abt=0002&abg=0. 
73 See Sifry, supra note 26. 




76 “A cookie is a very simple text file that gets downloaded onto your PC when you 
visit a website. They generally contain two bits of information: a site name and a unique 
user ID. Once the cookie is on your computer, the site ‘knows’ that you have been there 
before and can then use that knowledge to tailor the experience that you have. The vast 
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tandem with online advertising exchanges and media partners, a 
tracking cookie can serve ads personalized to an individual voter 
based on the data surveyed.78 For example, eXelate, one of the 
largest behavioral targeting firms, tracks 200 million unique indi-
viduals per month through cookies that track a user’s web traffic.79 
These cookies are able to determine a user’s age, sex, ethnicity, 
marital status, and profession as well as predict what items a user is 
looking to purchase based on web searches and sites frequented.80 
Ads are served utilizing eXelate data in a process where marketers 
bid to cookie match their own cookies with eXelate’s cookies and 
identify potential targets.81 
As mentioned earlier, campaigns also rely on consumer data for 
their micro-targeting efforts.82 Consumer data is a diverse category 
of data typically acquired by campaigns, parties, and political data 
firms from data brokers like Acxiom or Experian.83 Consumer data 
can reflect a voter’s buying patterns, lifestyle, demographics, and 
more. For example, Experian’s website has a category for “Life-
Event Triggers” and advertises the company’s ability to predict 
when individuals are new parents, homeowners, or have recently 
moved.84 Datalogix is a consumer data broker that allows its clients 
to target SUV drivers, green consumers, and pet owners, and seg-
ments individuals into 700 data categories based on their past pur-
chasing habits, demographics, and financial data.85 These various 
                                                                                                                            
majority of commercial websites—be they major online publishers, banks or ecommerce 
sites—will use them.” Olivia Solon, A Simple Guide to Cookies and How to Comply with EU 
Cookie Law, WIRED (May 25, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-
05/25/cookies-made-simple. 
77 “[Companies are] combining records from voter registration and records purchased 
from consumer data brokers and cookie-based profiles into very large troves of data about 
individual voters and their preferences and attitudes that are all things that are used for 
targeting purposes.” Meg Schwenzfeier, Consumer Data Privacy in Politics, PULITZER 
CENTER ON CRISIS REPORTING (Feb. 21, 2014), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/
north-america-united-states-political-campaigns-consumer-data-privacy. 
78 See Issenberg, supra note 40. 
79 See TUROW, supra note 58, at 79. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 80. 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 10–14. 
83 See Kreiss, supra note 12, at 71; see also ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 174–75. 
84 See Schwenzfeier, supra note 77. 
85 Id. 
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consumer data points are then combined with publicly available 
data like voter history, party affiliation, or age, or a campaign’s in-
ternal data to enable campaigns to target voters more precisely.86 
For example, Aristotle appends consumer data to voter lists pur-
chased from state voter databases, allowing its clients to search 
voters based on home purchase price, credit rating, pet ownership, 
or refinance loan type.87 
II. PRIVACY AND DEMOCRACY 
In order to understand how computational politics can harm a 
voter’s informational autonomy, and by extension privacy and de-
mocracy, it is important to first understand the theoretical under-
pinnings of informational autonomy and how it relates to normative 
conceptions of privacy and democracy. 
A. Theoretical Underpinnings 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously situated 
privacy in “the right to be let alone.”88 In their article, Warren and 
Brandeis were decrying a new technology of the day, smaller cam-
eras that could take an “instantaneous photograph,” allowing 
journalists to surreptitiously snap photos of private persons with-
out their consent.89 In the past, getting your picture taken was an 
ordeal that required sitting and posing for hours, and cameras were 
too large, bulky, and expensive to be portable.90 With the advent of 
new technologies, Warren and Brandeis feared that people would 
be powerless to keep their personal image private or control how it 
is used.91 
                                                                                                                            
86 “I might use your vote history, meaning what elections did you participate in, are 
you registered with one of the parties, what’s your age, and what’s your income, things 
like that …. And that information is combined with commercially available data and takes 
into account your buying patterns, lifestyle patterns, demographics, all kinds of other 
data.” Id. 
87 Premium Enhancements, ARISTOTLE, http://www.aristotle.com/political-
data/premium-enhancements/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
88 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890). 
89 Id. at 195–96; see also Solove, supra note 15, at 532. 
90 See Solove, supra note 15, at 532. 
91 Id. 
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Essential in Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy—
whether they knew at the time or not92—is a conception of privacy 
as informational autonomy. Professor Alan Westin took a similar 
approach in his oft-quoted definition of privacy, calling privacy the 
“claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others.”93 Paul Schwartz also takes an informa-
tional autonomy approach, describing privacy as “[seeking] to 
achieve informational self-determination through individual ste-
wardship of personal data, and by keeping information isolated 
from access.”94 The Supreme Court also recognized that “the 
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass 
the individual’s control of information concerning his or her per-
son.”95 Key to all of these analyses is a conception of informational 
autonomy as the right of individuals to determine for themselves 
how their personally identified information (PII)96 can be used, a 
principle that is also reflected in most privacy protection laws.97 
Indeed, privacy, self-determination, and personal autonomy 
serve as essential elements for democratic governance. Paul 
Schwartz has compared Internet surveillance to George Orwell’s 
                                                                                                                            
92 Warren and Brandeis did not describe the unauthorized photograph as 
“information,” but their concern about the information conveyed in the unauthorized 
photographs—and what that may suggest about the subject’s reputation—does suggest 
that they were prefiguring what would later be known as “information privacy.” See 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 88. 
93 See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
94 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000). 
95 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 
(1989). 
96 “The term ‘personally identifiable information’ refers to information which can be 
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security 
number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or 
identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date 
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES n.1 (2007). 
97 “Privacy laws in their various forms usually prohibit the release of personally 
identifiable information …. Information is personally identifiable if it can be traced to a 
specific individual.” Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 6–7 (2011). 
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telescreen,98 and he concluded that the harm to a citizen’s self-
determination from Internet surveillance is more potent due to 
“data storage possibilities and efficient search possibilities in any 
database using complex algorithms and other techniques of data 
mining.”99 Ruth Gavison also echoed the importance of privacy in 
a “democratic government because it fosters and encourages the 
moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democra-
cy.”100 Neil Richards argues that informational autonomy shapes 
the struggle “between individuals on the one hand and the corpo-
rate and government entities that seek information about them on 
the other.”101 An example from German law states: “[A] person 
who cannot oversee with sufficient certainty which of the informa-
tion about him is known in … his social environment, and who is 
unable to evaluate the knowledge of a possible communication 
partner, can be greatly inhibited in his freedom to decide or plan in 
personal self-determination.”102 This inhibition takes the form of 
“forced obedience,” which can eventuate when the state and pri-
vate organizations can “transform themselves into omnipotent 
parents and the rest of society into helpless children.”103 Joel Rei-
denberg also writes that adequate standards for the treatment of 
personal information are a necessary condition for citizen participa-
tion in a democracy,104 citing an analog from ancient Greece, where 
                                                                                                                            
98 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1656 
(1999) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6 (Penguin Books 1954) (1949)). 
99 Id. at 1702 n.294. 
100 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980) 
101 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1092 
(2006). “The problem with databases does not stem from any specific act, but is a 
systemic issue of power caused by the combination of relatively small actions, each of 
which when viewed in isolation would appear quite innocuous. Many modern privacy 
problems are the product of information flows, which occur between a variety of different 
entities. There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is spread among a multitude of 
actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each doing different things at different 
times.” Daniel J. D’Amico, Book Review, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 537, 541 (2005) 
(reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2004)). 
102 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector 
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 562 (1995). 
103 Id. at 560. 
104 “Politically, adequate standards for the treatment of personal information are a 
necessary condition for citizen participation in a democracy. Since ancient Greece, a 
citizen’s right to participate in society has depended on the ability to control the 
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a “citizen’s right to participate in society has depended on the abil-
ity to control the disclosure of personal information.”105 
However, what are we to make of the non-governmental status 
computational politicians enjoy? Is it fair to assume that normative 
conceptions of privacy and democracy have purchase when the 
agent conducting the surveillance and social engineering is a non-
profit political party, campaign, or for-profit corporation? The an-
swer must be that the distinction should not matter given the im-
portant role private institutions do play—and must play—in our 
electoral process. Moreover, privacy harms are not totally alle-
viated by the fact that private institutions largely engage in compu-
tational politics. No doubt, federal106 and state107 institutions are 
incredibly secretive about their data, but citizens do have some lev-
ers to pull, whether it be via sunshine laws or the political process. 
Parties, campaigns, and corporations that engage in computational 
politics are very proprietary about the PII they have gathered and 
their analytical methodologies,108 and guard data closely out of fear 
that partisan opponents will gain access.109 It is arguable that in-
                                                                                                                            
disclosure of personal information. Without appropriate standards, citizens may be 
unduly constrained in their interactions with society. Socially, the treatment of personal 
information is an element of basic human dignity. Fair treatment of personal information 
accords respect to an individual’s personality. Standards, thus, structure social 
relationships.” Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the 
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 497–98 (1995). 
105 Id. 
106 “[E]xisting policies of online transparency are largely developed for the sake of 
public accountability, but fail to achieve it. In some cases, appropriate transparency 
requirements exist but are not enforced. In other instances, transparency policies allow 
agencies considerable discretion to decide which information will be disclosed. In still 
other cases, transparency policies target information that is irrelevant for purposes of 
public accountability. To realize the unfulfilled potential of open government, an 
alternative regulatory regime is required.” Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency with(Out) 
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 140 
(2012). 
107 See Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of 
FOIA, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 387, 416 (2010) (describing the need for FOI litigation in some 
states because state and local officials can be antagonistic and uncooperative with those 
that request information). 
108 PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 3, 193. 
109 “The 50-state voter file, which is available for the first time to organizations other 
than the Obama campaign and Democratic candidates (but not to Republicans or 
Republicans fronts), is updated over 200 times each year.” SmartVAN, NGP VAN, 
https://www.ngpvan.com/smartvan (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
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formational autonomy is even more at stake when private unregu-
lated actors trade in PII, especially if legislators are likely to exempt 
political data from any larger data privacy regulatory regime out of 
self-interest.110 
B. Fair Information Practices 
While informational autonomy is a well-developed principle in 
legal theory111 and in legal doctrine,112 harms to informational au-
tonomy caused by computational politics are in no way illegal. Fed-
eral privacy laws that mandate protections for PII, like the Child-
ren’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),113 Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (FCRA),114 Health Insurance Portability and Accoun-
tability Act (HIPAA),115 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,116 and Privacy 
                                                                                                                            
110 “‘Often when data laws are being proposed and put forward, the politicians exempt 
themselves,’ said Don Hinman, senior VP for data strategy at Epsilon, which gets some of 
its data from political advertisers but mainly is a purveyor of consumer information.” 
Kate Kaye, Obama’s Approach to Big Data: Do As I Say, Not As I Do, ADVERTISING AGE 
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://adage.com/article/digital/obama-s-approach-big-d=ata-i-
i/238346/. 
111 See supra Part II.A. 
112 “To begin with, both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy 
encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.” U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000). “COPPA imposes certain requirements on operators of 
websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of 
other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting 
personal information online from a child under 13 years of age.” Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule (“COPPA”), FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-
regulatory-reform-proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule (last visited Dec. 
19, 2014). 
114 FCRA requires consumer credit reporting companies to adopt procedures for 
consumer information that are fair and equitable with regard to the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
115 HIPAA’s “privacy rule” limits the use of “protected health information.” See 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d(1)–(8) (2002). 
116 “The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act requires financial institutions—companies that 
offer consumers financial products or services like loans, financial or investment advice, 
or insurance—to explain their information-sharing practices to their customers and to 
safeguard sensitive data.” Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, FTC, http://business.ftc.gov/
privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-bliley-act (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 6801 (2006). 
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Act,117 are either too narrow so as not to apply to computational 
politics or only apply to governmental data practices. 
However, all of these laws safeguard informational autonomy 
because they incorporate a longstanding principle in federal and 
state data and computer record-keeping practices known as “fair 
information practices” (FIPs). The principle was first applied to 
computer databases in a 1973 report by the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in which the agency ac-
knowledged potential harms to individuals when they lack control 
over personal information.118 The report set forth several “Fair In-
formation Practices,”119 including that “[t]here must be a way for 
an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent.”120 This principle influenced the Privacy Act 
of 1974,121 the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995,122 and oth-
ers.123 FIPs vary in definition and implementation, but Professor 
Paul F. Schwartz helpfully distills them into four basic require-
ments: “(1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data; 
(2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited procedural and 
substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.”124 
                                                                                                                            
117 “The Privacy Act of 1974 … establishes a code of fair information practices that 
governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about 
individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.” Privacy Act of 
1974, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988). 
118 SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. (OS)73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973) [hereinafter SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM.]; see also Lillian 
R. Bevier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on 
Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 462 (1995). 
119 Solove, supra note 15, at 520. 
120 SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 118; see also Solove, supra note 15, at 520. 
121 Solove, supra note 15, at 520. 
122 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
123 Solove, supra note 15, at 520. 
124 Schwartz, supra note 98, at 1614. 
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FIPs can serve to safeguard democracy by defining the terms of 
individual participation in social and political life.125 Schwartz has 
linked the FIPs to the preservation of democratic order, “by pro-
viding access to one’s personal data [and] information about how it 
will be processed,” as well as how “the law seeks to structure the 
terms on which individuals confront the information demands of 
the community, private bureaucratic entities, and the State.”126 
Applying FIPs in computational politics can remediate harms 
to informational autonomy and democracy in three ways. First, 
transparency could mitigate the surreptitious nature of data-
gathering in many online and offline scenarios. If computational 
politicians reveal to voters how their data is gathered, who it is be-
ing shared with, and how it is being processed, voters will be more 
aware of campaign practices that seek to influence or manipulate in 
ways they may disapprove of. Second, “defined obligations” and 
“procedural and substantive rights” can afford voters the control 
necessary to make changes to data once it has been revealed to 
them, either by correcting false data, removing data that they no 
longer want on file, or opting out of tracking all together. Lastly, by 
offering more transparency and control to voters, campaigns can 
improve upon a system of data collection premised on a legal 
framework for consent that is more or less a sham. Although voters 
“voluntarily” disclose their information to campaigns, websites, 
and many other consumer services, they almost universally fail to 
appreciate the degree to which companies, campaigns, and political 
parties retain the right to freely trade their data in an endless chain 
of secondary and tertiary uses. FIPs can improve this system by 
informing voters if their data will be traded for secondary uses and 
allowing them the choice to restrict subsequent uses or even opt 
out altogether. 
C. Informational Privacy Harms 
Like Warren and Brandeis’s camera, computational politics 
harms privacy in ways dramatically different from anything pre-
                                                                                                                            
125 Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2000). 
126 Id. 
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viously possible.127 Network computing, data storage, and compre-
hensive records of online behavior128 all allow private actors to sur-
reptitiously monitor voter information for their own purposes.129 
Privacy experts have connected the loss of informational autonomy 
with a variety of harms to democracy, including discrimination,130 
the chilling of political speech,131 and unaccountable “black box” 
algorithms.132 This Note will now provide a brief summary of each, 
and describe how they apply in the context of computational poli-
tics. 
1. Discrimination 
Computational politics can allow companies, parties, and cam-
paigns to distinguish individual members submerged in groups 
based on granular individual characteristics, preferences, and activ-
ities.133 Algorithms can then crunch the data and allow campaigns 
and corporations to discriminate based on an infinite number of 
data points and treat individuals differently on that basis.134 Predic-
tive privacy harms can and do result when computational politi-
cians discriminate between individuals based on their data pro-
files.135 A voter given a particular classification is saddled with any 
“cascading disadvantages” associated with that particular classifi-
cation.136 Disadvantages include “redlining,”137 where campaigns 
                                                                                                                            
127 Schwartz, supra note 98, at 1610–11. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See infra Part II.C.1. 
131 See infra Part II.C.2. 
132 See infra Part II.C.3. 
133 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of 
Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 351, 355 (2013). 
134 See id. 
135 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014); see also PASQUALE, supra 
note 24, at 215. 
136 See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 32. 
137 “Redlining is an old term used to refer to the organizational practice of identifying 
the parts of a community that are difficult or problematic to serve. Most often the term 
refers to how organizations decide that some people, by virtue of neighborhood attributes 
and perceptions, should be offered low standards of service and indenturing obligations. 
These neighborhoods would be circled in red ink as places where insurance companies 
would give uncompetitive rates, banks would have more demanding repayment plans, 
government agencies would make fewer investments, or real estate developers would 
2015] CRACKING THE ONE-WAY MIRROR 1029 
 
use data to ignore voters with attributes that suggest an unlikelih-
ood to vote.138 According to Philip N. Howard, political campaigns 
redline when they are “declining to serve a community if it is not 
part of a sensitive electoral district or declining to serve individuals 
if they are perceived to be less sensitive to the political issue.”139 
For example, Howard argues that the ability to disengage with 
“unlikely” or “unpersuadable” voters through modeling suggests 
that campaigns can apply the “swing state” strategy deployed in 
presidential politics but at the individual level140—meaning that 
“non–voters” can be ignored while others can be flooded with 
campaign material,141 introducing a new form of categorical inequa-
lity into our politics.142 
Campaigns are redlining voters with audience segmentation 
tools provided by political data firms. For example, in 2012, Aris-
totle partnered with Intermarkets, a digital ad firm and ad sales rep 
for web publishers. The partnership combines Aristotle’s political 
data with consumer data tracked from Intermarkets’ “cookie 
pool” in order to “[segment] online audiences into groups political 
advertisers want to target.”143 Another example is TargetSmart—
an active Democratic data firm during the 2014 midterms—which 
segments voters based on data used by consumer marketers in or-
der to model each voter based on a persuadability factor,144 not un-
like the Obama campaign’s strategy in 2012.145 [x+1] Inc.,146 a com-
pany that provides artificial intelligence advertising solutions for 
                                                                                                                            
refuse to build new ventures.” See PHILLIP N. HOWARD, NEW MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND 
THE MANAGED CITIZEN 132 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
138 Kreiss, supra note 12, at 73–74. 
139 See HOWARD, supra note 137, at 133. 
140 See Tufekci, supra note 39. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Kate Kaye, Intermarkets Pairs With Lotame to Enhance Aristotle Data Relationship, 
CLICKZ (July 23, 2012), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/2193317/intermarkets-
pairs-with-lotame-to-enhance-aristotle-data-relationship. 
144 The Numbers Behind ‘The Persuadables,’ BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-27/the-numbers-behind-the-
persuadables. 
145 Sifry, supra note 26. 
146 Now acquired by Rocket Fuel. See Press Release, Rocket Fuel, Rocket Fuel to 
Acquire [x+1] (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://rocketfuel.com/press_release/rocket-
fuel-to-acquire-x1. 
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digital marketers,147 including some politics and advocacy organiza-
tions,148 accesses massive databases of online behavior gathered 
through tracking technologies across the web.149 [x+1] uses this da-
ta to help its clients draw assumptions about a target’s proclivities 
and alter displayed ads for each individual based on his or her seg-
ment.150 A test subject during a Wall Street Journal investigation 
was placed in a [x+1] segment called “White Picket Fences,” 
meant for individuals who “live in small cities, have a median in-
come of $53,901, are 25 to 44 years old with kids, work in white-
collar or service jobs, generally own their own home, and have 
some college education.”151 
There is also real concern that these algorithms can result in 
discriminatory outcomes for members of protected classes. Algo-
rithms can “find strong correlations, which result in discriminatory 
outcomes while based on neutral factors.”152 For example, FTC 
Chief Technologist Latanya Sweeney discovered how race can af-
fect what types of ads are served by predictive online advertising.153 
Sweeney discovered a disproportionate likelihood that advertise-
ments for arrest-record searches appeared on websites with dis-
tinctly African-American qualities.154 Her research also demon-
strated that these advertisements were 25 percent more likely to 
show up on a search for distinctively black names when compared 
to white names.155 Given the potential for harm,156 data scientists 
like Cynthia Dwork have urged algorithms to be subjected to a 
                                                                                                                            
147 About Rocket Fuel, ROCKET FUEL, http://rocketfuel.com/about-rocket-
fuel#success_stories (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
148 Id. 
149 Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only, 




152 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 133, at 358–59; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 
38–39. 
153 Laura Ryan, Feds Investigate ‘Discrimination by Algorithm,’ NAT’L J. (Sept. 15, 2014); 
see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
154 Ryan, supra note 153; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
155 Ryan, supra note 153; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
156 Wade Henderson & Rashad Robinson, Big Data is a Civil Rights Issue, TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (Apr. 8, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/big-data-is-a-civil-
rights-issue. 
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“fairness constraint,” through which an algorithm’s discriminato-
ry outcomes are tested to see if similar individuals are treated simi-
larly.157 Civil rights groups have urged for reforms as well, citing a 
need for individual autonomy over personal information “that is 
known to a corporation [that] can easily be used by companies and 
the government against vulnerable populations, including women, 
the formerly incarcerated, immigrants, religious minorities, the 
LGBT community, and young people.”158 The White House Re-
port on Big Data also warned that “big data analytics have the po-
tential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how per-
sonal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health, 
education, and the marketplace.”159 
2. Chilling Effects 
 The knowledge that all consumer, Internet, and political trans-
actions are surveilled, compiled, and sold can alter a citizen’s be-
havior and even chill political association.160 There are three rea-
sons why associational chilling can occur when voters lose their 
informational autonomy. 
First, consumer data-mining practices are surreptitious, pas-
sive, and automatic.161 Voters are unable to predict when or how 
their digital dossiers are being compiled and what the data suggests 
about them.162 For example, campaigns compile voter lists contain-
ing the names and contact information of all voters that have inte-
                                                                                                                            
157 Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness (Nov. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~zemel/documents/fairAwareItcs2012.pdf. 
158 Press Release, The Leadership Conference, Civil Rights Principles for the Era of Big 
Data (2014), available at http://www.civilrights.org/press/2014/civil-rights-principles-
big-data.html. 
159 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES (May 1, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 
38. 
160 Evans, supra note 10, at 882. For an example of a complainant alleging the chilling of 
associational rights due to governmental data-gathering, see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 
(1972); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating that associational disclosure can result in 
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility). 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
162 Id. 
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racted with the campaign online and offline.163 These lists are then 
matched with data firms like Aristotle, which lay bare a voter’s 
consumer habits along with models for persuadability or other algo-
rithmic judgments.164 
Second, because campaigns are subjected to practically no 
regulation for the repurposing of political data, voters are unable to 
predict what other campaigns or candidates will benefit from their 
data in the future. For example, the privacy policies used by both 
candidates in the 2014 Kentucky Senate race lacked sufficient clari-
ty about potential secondary use of voter data. Democratic candi-
date Alison Lundergran Grimes’s online privacy policy promises 
not to share a voter’s data with third parties except with those 
“candidates, organizations, campaigns, groups or causes that we 
believe have similar political viewpoints, principles or objec-
tives,”165 a policy that tracks with the Democratic National Com-
mittee’s own policy.166 Senator Mitch McConnell’s online privacy 
policy does not even acknowledge third-party sharing of personal 
information,167 but the Republican party reserves the right to share 
data with like-minded organizations.168 Although the policies may 
be short and comprehensible as is recommended by the FTC,169 
they give little instruction as to what may happen to a voter’s per-
sonal information once the campaign is over. 
                                                                                                                            
163 See supra Part I.C. 
164 Aristotle’s website advertises a “data matching” service that allows campaigns to 
“match [their] list to [Aristotle’s] voter file and pull out records that [they] may want to 
exclude from [their] database.” Data Matching, ARISTOTLE, http://aristotle.com/
political-data/data-matching/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
165 Privacy Policy, ALISON FOR KENTUCKY, http://alisonforkentucky.com/privacy-
policy/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
166 Privacy Policy, DEMOCRATS, http://www.democrats.org/privacy_policy (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2014). 
167 Privacy Policy, TEAM MITCH, http://www.teammitch.com/privacy_policy (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
168 “We may share your information with like-minded organizations. The RNC may 
share information—that you voluntarily provide us—with like-minded organizations 
committed to the principles or candidates of the Republican Party, Republican State Party 
organizations and local Republican groups. The RNC may provide your email address or 
other personal information to authorized third parties required to deliver a particular 
service. These third parties may not use said information for any other purpose than to 
carry out the services they are performing for the RNC.” Terms & Conditions and Privacy 
Policy, GOP, https://www.gop.com/privacy/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
169 FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at viii. 
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Third, fear of discrimination and redlining can cause chilling ef-
fects. As discussed earlier, campaigns that engage in computational 
politics are able to discriminate and profile the electorate in new 
and powerful ways.170 Politicians can choose to under serve or ig-
nore particular parts of their constituency based on what an algo-
rithmic model tells them about that group’s electoral utility.171 Al-
though the fear of redlining is nothing new,172 the addition of com-
putational politics can make the practice a lot more harmful due to 
its pervasive and surreptitious nature. 
3. Black Boxes 
Because computational politics involves opaque, latent, and so-
phisticated computer modeling to carry out highly effective cam-
paigns of persuasion and social engineering, there are justifiable 
concerns about the further accretion of political influence to a 
wealthy and powerful few.173 This accretion of power is enhanced 
by the loss of an individual’s informational autonomy which makes 
mining the raw material for computational politics dirt cheap.174 
But also, power is solidified due to the opacity of political data 
firms that operate so-called “black box” algorithms in computa-
tional politics.175  
As discussed earlier, computational politics is conducted sur-
reptitiously and is subjected to little independent oversight.176 As a 
result, private data practices are opaque and voters have no ability 
to control—much less anticipate—when or how their data is col-
lected or how it is used to distinguish them from other voters.177 
Professor Frank Pasquale has discussed at length the potential 
harms caused by opaque algorithms in search.178 Pasquale discusses 
the role of Internet gatekeepers like Google, who operate informa-
tional bottlenecks that can “manipulate the flow of informa-
                                                                                                                            
170 See supra Part II.C.1. 
171 Id. 
172 HOWARD, supra note 137. 
173 See generally Tufekci, supra note 39. 
174 See generally PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 30–34. 
175 See id. at 9–10. 
176 See supra Part II.B. 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
178 See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 66. 
1034 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:1007 
 
tion … [and suppress] some sources while highlighting others” 
either because of intrinsic preferences or inducement from oth-
ers.179 Lack of informational autonomy and oversight can facilitate 
manipulation through unaccountable private “black-box”180 algo-
rithms. Pasquale warns of a “black box society”181 where private 
firms can lock away information even when there is a strong public 
interest for disclosure.182 In Pasquale’s view, unaccountable Inter-
net power can stifle innovation by manipulating the market in order 
to maintain power and “pick winners” among content and applica-
tion providers.183 For example, Facebook has demonstrated that its 
proprietary algorithms can affect voter turnout,184 albeit by a slim 
.39 percent, but enough to swing a close election.185 Jonathan Zit-
train explains how Facebook, or another dominant social network, 
could in the future affect electoral outcomes in far more insidious 
ways,186 by using the Facebook newsfeed to only activate voters 
that Facebook’s algorithms have identified as likely to support the 
company’s favored candidate.187   
                                                                                                                            
179 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1165 (2008); see also 
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 67. 
180 See Frank Pasquale, Battling Black Boxes, MADISONIAN.NET (Sept. 21, 2006), 
http://madisonian.net/2006/09/21/battling-black-boxes/. 
181 See generally PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 16–18. 
182 Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers 
and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 286 (2008). 
183 Id. at 299; see also PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 191–92. 
184 Sifry, supra note 26. 
185 See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 74. 
186 “Now consider a hypothetical, hotly contested future election. Suppose that Mark 
Zuckerberg personally favors whichever candidate you don’t like. He arranges for a 
voting prompt to appear within the newsfeeds of tens of millions of active Facebook 
users—but unlike in the 2010 experiment, the group that will not receive the message is 
not chosen at random. Rather, Zuckerberg makes use of the fact that Facebook ‘likes’ can 
predict political views and party affiliation, even beyond the many users who proudly 
advertise those affiliations directly. With that knowledge, our hypothetical Zuck chooses 
not to spice the feeds of users unsympathetic to his views. Such machinations then flip 
the outcome of our hypothetical election. Should the law constrain this kind of 
behavior?” Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever 
Finding Out, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering. See also 
PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 74. 
187 Id. 
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Pasquale’s critiques of search and social networks can be analo-
gized to computational politics. Political data firms like Aristotle 
operate as informational gatekeepers and solidify their market do-
minance with exclusive contractual arrangements to consolidate 
data with advertising firms,188 market research firms,189 and data 
analytics firms.190 Market dominance can be used to affect particu-
lar political outcomes. In the case of partisan data operations it is 
clear that computational tools are meant to affect a particular parti-
san outcome. As for non-partisan firms like Aristotle, there re-
mains a concern that particular kinds of political outcomes or can-
didates can be prioritized. For example, the corporate leaders in 
some of these non-partisan firms have deep ties with powerful D.C. 
partisans,191 which can inform which clients a firm is willing to take 
on192 or what business contracts to enter into.193 Beyond partisan-
ship, computational politics can privilege a wealthier class of can-
didates and campaigns that can afford their highly effective and ex-
pensive suite of data services194 or who have spent years investing 
                                                                                                                            
188 Kaye, supra note 143. 
189 For example, the market research firm Claritas has an exclusive data-sharing 
arrangement with Aristotle. Verini, supra note 55. 
190 Press Release, Evolving Strategies and Aristotle Introduce Groundbreaking Voter 




191 “[T]he companies Aristotle does business with have deep ties in Washington. 
Acxiom’s recently retired CEO, Charles Morgan, is a longtime friend of Bill and Hillary 
Clinton’s. Wesley Clark, the retired general and former Democratic presidential 
candidate, used to sit on Acxiom’s board. Catalist, a data-mining firm providing voter lists 
to the Clinton campaign in the 2008 race, is presided over by Harold Ickes Jr., Bill’s 
onetime deputy chief of staff, and Laura Quinn, who held the same position in Al Gore’s 
office. In 2005, the Department of Justice alone bought $19 million worth of records from 
data miners, according to the Government Accountability Office.” Verini, supra note 55. 
192 “F.E.C. filings from 2006–7 show, however, that the majority of Aristotle’s client 
candidates were and are Republicans. Among them are former House majority leader 
Tom DeLay and former California congressman Duke Cunningham. The National Rifle 
Association was once Aristotle’s biggest client.” Id. 
193 See Press Release, supra note 190. 
194 See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 174–75 (describing the cost of commercial data 
services from the country’s largest commercial data warehouses like InfoUSA, Acxiom, 
and Experian). 
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in expensive in-house data operations195—a problem that is com-
pounded given the ever-increasing price of post-Citizens United 
campaigning.196 
III. UNDERSTANDING HOW TO REFORM 
COMPUTATIONAL POLITICS 
A. Challenges 
Given the role computational politics plays in influencing im-
portant political outcomes for all Americans, it is essential that vot-
ers are afforded some insight into and control over these systems. 
Fundamentally, partisan and non-partisan political data firms are in 
the business of information about voters and how they behave, and 
that kind of information is only valuable if it is exclusive, and re-
mains exclusive through the full power of copyright protections.197 
Trade secrets make it impossible to test the fairness, validity, or 
honesty behind algorithms used in computational politics.198 Suc-
cessful firms in computational politics will not be evaluated for the 
fairness, validity, or honesty behind their voter data,199 and instead 
can only be judged on a reputation built on past successes.200 
Meanwhile, the voters that make the system possible with their da-
ta will have no insight into or control over these important algo-
rithms. In order to prevent the aforementioned privacy harms,201 
                                                                                                                            
195 “The Republican National Committee, which had already invested in a national 
ground game, built an in-house data and analytics infrastructure. They tested their model 
universe, making thousands of calls each week to voters in order to better refine their 
targeting assumptions. And they used the special election in March in Florida’s 13th 
Congressional District to quietly test their smartphone apps.” Ashley Parker, Chastened 
Republicans Beat Democrats at Their Own Ground Game, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/politics/republicans-beat-democrats-at-their-
own-ground-game.html. 
196 The Money Behind the Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); Ian Vandewalker, 
Outside Spending and Dark Money in Toss-Up Senate Races Post-Election Update, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/blog/
Post_Election_Spending.pdf. 
197 See PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 215. 
198 Id. at 217. 
199 Id. at 217–18. 
200 Id. 
201 See supra Parts II.C.1–3. 
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regulatory regimes must be put in place to allow voters some access 
to the data and algorithms behind computational politics. 
But legislating strong data privacy protections is very diffi-
cult.202 Many proposals to regulate data are overly restrictive, un-
der-protective, or both.203 In some cases, sophisticated data firms 
will find a way to circumvent new restrictions and in so doing make 
their services more valuable.204 Also, because legislating political 
data protections necessarily implicates the First Amendment,205 
restrictions that outright forbid tracking a citizen’s political be-
liefs—similar to the EU Privacy Directive—are simply not worka-
ble.206 
                                                                                                                            
202 “Of all reputation systems … credit scores are by far the most regulated. Yet 
regulation has done little to improve them. Penalties for erroneous information on credit 
reports are too low to merit serious attention from credit bureaus.” PASQUALE, supra note 
24, at 191. 
203 Id.; see also Evans, supra note 10, at 893–94. 
204 “Johnson et al. recommend making donor data ‘read only’ to increase the cost of 
importing such data into political databases. This would seem to only bar outsider 
candidates with limited resources from using the data, while professional political data-
miners will quickly find a way to work around the nuisance—making their service even 
more valuable. They also propose limiting the lifespan of contributor data, but again, 
professional data-miners could quickly find a work-around and mark up the cost of their 
services.” See Evans, supra note 10, at 893–94. 
205 “[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review 
article: ‘The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public 
or general interest’ …. One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an 
attendant loss of privacy.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); see also Philip 
N. Howard & Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative Perspective, 15(12) FIRST MONDAY 
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http:// firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/2975/2627 (“On First Amendment grounds, provided they 
remain non-state actors candidates and parties enjoy broad latitude with respect to their 
data practices.”). 
206 “The processing of personal data, revealing race or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religion or beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of genetic data or data 
concerning health or sex life or criminal convictions or related security measures shall be 
prohibited.” Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
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B. Reform Skeptics 
Reform skeptics may understandably protest the regulation of a 
lawful data industry. Citizens are freely giving away their informa-
tional autonomy. And why not—especially if more data results in 
higher turnout,207 more relevant political ads,208 or if the private 
data used by campaigns was given away in exchange for a service 
like a discount at a supermarket check-out209 or for the use of a so-
cial network.210 Others may even question whether computational 
politics truly predicts a voter’s actual behavior or reveals the 
“truth” behind their behaviors or motivations; that “truth” may 
not exist in any case.211 
Indeed, computational politics can boost voter turnout. Face-
book has demonstrated this with its experiments during the 2010 
midterm election.212 Also, it is true that with more data, campaigns 
can craft better appeals to individual voters and even motivate pre-
viously disengaged voters.213 An example of this from the 2012 Ob-
ama campaign was the use of Facebook to match supporters with 
their friends living in swing states. Supporters were prompted with 
a picture of their friend and were told to click a button to automati-
cally urge those targeted voters to register to vote, vote early, or get 
to the polls.214 According to the campaign, 1 in 5 people contacted 
by a Facebook friend acted on the request, in large part because the 
campaign was able to match supporters with people they knew and 
                                                                                                                            
207 See supra text accompanying notes 39–44. 
208 Id. 
209 Donna Ferguson, How Supermarkets Get Your Data—and What They Do with It, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/jun/
08/supermarkets-get-your-data. 
210 Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS NEWS (Mar. 9, 
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-informat
ion/. 
211 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (2000). 
212 Micah L. Sifry, Facebook Wants You to Vote on Tuesday. Here’s How It Messed With 
Your Feed in 2012, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2014/10/can-voting-facebook-button-improve-voter-turnout. 
213 See Evans, supra note 10, at 896. 
214 Michael Scherer, Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama 
Win, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secret-
world-of-quants-and-data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/2/. 
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deliver targeted appeals based on personal information received 
through the campaign’s Facebook app.215 
Although Facebook’s voting experiment appeared to be a great 
public service, without better insight into the black boxes that con-
duct these experiments, there is no guarantee that future social 
networks will be so benevolent. Also, the issue is not whether in-
sights afforded by data are accurately portraying reality or if voters 
are indeed receiving more relevant campaign ads. Rather, the issue 
is who controls those modes of prediction,216 whether it works well 
enough to affect outcomes, and whether that mechanism has any 
obligation to remain accountable to the individuals whose data 
serves as its raw material. This inquiry is more relevant because at 
bottom, the point of political data is not to help campaigns become 
more congenial to the attitudes of voters. The goal is to win elec-
tions—and the data suggests that it is helping.217 Data-driven tar-
geting is not meant to merely enable choice by the target market; 
rather it means to effectuate choice by the marketer.218 When a 
communication is framed in order to become more attractive by 
reflecting a target’s desires, it does not necessarily make the com-
munication less manipulative.219 Manipulation can also be en-
hanced by the lack of meaningful consent on the part of voters. 
Voters may consent to the initial use of their political information, 
but most would not have consented to its continuous aggregation 
and applications in unexpected ways.220 
                                                                                                                            
215 Id. 
216 Cohen, supra note 211, at 1406. 
217 “[Campaigns] develop predictive models that produce individual-level scores that 
predict citizens’ likelihoods of performing certain political behaviors, supporting 
candidates and issues, and responding to targeted interventions. The use of these scores 
has increased dramatically during the last few election cycles. Simulations suggest that 
these advances could yield sizable and electorally meaningful gains to campaigns that 
harness them.” Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 38, at 27. 
218 Cohen, supra note 211, at 1407. 
219 Id. 
220 Philip N. Howard, Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in 
Political Campaign Strategy, 597 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 166 (2005). 
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C. Applying the Fair Information Practices and First Amendment 
Concerns 
So if information wants to be free,221 how do we regulate it? On 
what basis do legislators and regulators impose additional obliga-
tions on computational politicians—especially when the data was 
acquired with consent, albeit passively? Answering this question 
will require a return to the identifiable privacy interest at stake in 
computational politics: informational autonomy.222 
Informational autonomy advocates argue that individuals assert 
a property interest over their personal information.223 With a prop-
erty interest, an individual can assert control over use and protect 
against misuse.224 The extent to which individuals ought to effect 
control over data is disputed. On the one hand, enforcing privacy 
rights as vigorously as copyright law may make progress in protect-
ing privacy,225 but would also result in the blocking of the free flow 
of data across the Internet, a proposition that raises clear First 
Amendment concerns.226 No doubt, the proper regulatory regime 
exists somewhere between these extremes. 
Applying FIPs to computational politics would be the best way 
to balance these competing concerns for two reasons. First, FIPs 
                                                                                                                            
221 Steward Brand, Keep Designing: How the Information Economy is Being Created and 
Shaped by the Hacker Ethic, WHOLE EARTH REV. 44 (May 1985). 
222 Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2190 (2004). 
223 “To note that privacy talk is embedded in the discourse of property, of course, is to 
beg the question whether reality is similarly embedded. Some philosophers argue that 
privacy has meaning only to the extent that it is reducible to a property interest.” Cohen, 
supra note 211, at 1379; see also Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295, 333–34 (1995) (describing a “quasi-property” interest in 
informational privacy theory). 
224 Lawrence Lessig, CODE VERSION 2.0 229 (2006). 
225 Id. Moreover, algorithmic processes are premised on smooth, fast, and efficient 
transactions; introducing reforms will probably slow things down and incur additional 
expenses. PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 213. 
226 Schwartz, supra note 223, at 333; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for 
Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 743, 760 (2000) (describing desirous uses of personal information without 
prior consent and the First Amendment concerns of limiting use through individual 
consent). Most scholars addressing the cyber-property controversy concur, arguing that 
property-rule protection for network resources is wholly inappropriate; this line of 
argument guided the court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi. Bellia, supra note 222, at 
2190. 
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do not take away a private actor’s ability to speak in violation of the 
First Amendment. FIPs one,227 two,228 and four229 regulate only 
business practices of private entities without silencing speech.230 
For example, FCRA imposes a defined transparency regime that 
requires data companies to provide information used to evaluate a 
consumer’s credit upon his request.231 Paul Schwartz has likened 
FIP statutes like FCRA to regulating other uses of information in 
the private sector such as food labeling,232 in that the regulation of 
private sector information in order to ensure the goals of transpa-
rency, like fairness and accuracy, is an uncontroversial regulation 
of speech. Second, the FIPs have enjoyed longstanding use in fed-
eral, state, and international information privacy protection law for 
decades233 and have survived First Amendment challenges.234 
Their use is battle-tested and uncontroversial. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE 
AND REGULATORY REFORM 
A. Regulatory Implementation of the Fair Information Practices 
As stated earlier, implementing FIPs can foster individual au-
tonomy in computational politics by promoting political data trans-
                                                                                                                            
227 “(1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data.” See supra text 
accompanying note 124. 
228 “(2) transparent processing systems.” See supra text accompanying note 124. 
229 “(4) external oversight.” See supra text accompanying note 124. 
230 Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1561–62. 
231 15 U.S.C. § 1681(d) (2006). “No prevention of speech about anyone takes place, for 
example, when the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 requires that certain information be 
given to a consumer when an ‘investigative consumer report’ is prepared about her.” 
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1562. 
232 “The First Amendment does not prevent the government from requiring product 
labels on food products or the use of ‘plain English’ by publicly traded companies in 
reports sent to their investors or Form 10-Ks filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.” Schwartz, supra note 125, at 1562. 
233 See supra Part II.B. 
234 The Federal Trade Commission’s ban on the sale of target marketing lists under 
FCRA was not a violation of the credit reporting agency’s First Amendment rights under 
intermediate scrutiny because “protecting the privacy of consumer credit information is 
substantial.” See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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parency and encouraging choice on the part of voters.235 There are 
plenty of statutes that have implemented FIPs that could serve as a 
model for implementation in the computational politics context.236 
For example, COPPA emphasizes transparency and choice for par-
ents by requiring operators of any website that knowingly collects 
personal information from children to provide notice on the site of 
what information is collected, how the data is used, and whether 
the data is shared with third parties.237 The Act also grants parents 
the power to request their child’s data and block a website from 
surveilling their child’s online activities in the future.238 COPPA is 
instructive of how regulators could implement a regime that pro-
motes transparency of data, gives voters choices about what to do 
with their data, and provides options to opt out of future data ga-
thering. 
1. Transparency and Choice Portal 
Fairness, in the collection of personal information, dictates that 
the subject of the collection have at least as much information as 
the entity collecting it.239 In order to foster fairness, voters need a 
right to access the black box data behind computational politics. A 
“right to access” is an uncontroversial FIP,240 which has been ac-
cepted by both government and private entities and is incorporated 
into federal and state law as well as private business practices.241 
Of course, a right to access would be meaningless without a 
corresponding right to delete or correct data or disable future track-
ing.242 One such proposal would be a one-stop web portal where 
computational politicians disclose voter data and offer voters a 
                                                                                                                            
235 INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA 
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
(2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2010/
december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 113–17. 
237 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i-ii) (2002). 
238 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(i-iii) (2002). 
239 Preston N. Thomas, Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case for A Right of Audit in Private 
Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 182 (2009). 
240 Id. at 183. 
241 Id. 
242 “Merely being aware of the contents of a dossier provides little comfort or help to an 
individual troubled by potential inaccuracies or misuses of that information.” Id. 
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chance to correct or delete data or disable tracking. The regime 
could mirror COPPA’s language and target websites and online 
services that collect a voter’s data with knowledge and for political 
purposes. 
Also, centralized data clearinghouses spurned by government 
regulation are not new. In response to the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003’s (FACTA)243 requirement that a con-
sumer reporting agency offer free annual credit reports for con-
sumers,244 a group of the largest consumer data firms (Equifax, Ex-
perian, and TransUnion) created AnnualCreditReport.com,245 the 
official, centralized source of free credit reports.246 A similar web-
site could be used to disclose data used for computational politics, 
including what kind of data is being gathered, what it reveals, and 
who it is being shared with. Also, to ensure meaningful compliance, 
regulators could impanel “data auditors,” government employees 
charged with understanding commercial and political data practices 
and detecting and deterring behaviors that violate FIPs or result in 
harmful discriminatory outcomes.247 
In a 2012 consumer privacy report, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion recommended that consumer data brokers maintain websites 
where they could identify themselves to consumers, describe how 
they collect and use consumer data, and detail the access rights and 
other choices they provide with respect to the consumer data they 
maintain.248 A similar website, but centrally operated by a federal 
agency, could be an effective tool in order to foster FIPs in a com-
putational politician’s data policies. 
                                                                                                                            
243 15 U.S.C. § 1681(j) (2006). 
244 15 U.S.C. § 1681(j) (2006). 
245 ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM, https://www.annualcreditreport.com/ (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2014). 
246 Thomas, supra note 239, at 191. 
247 PASQUALE, supra note 24, at 151; Thomas, supra note 239, at 172 (arguing that a 
“right to audit” exists in the FIPs). 
248 FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at v. Acxiom maintains such a website, allowing 
consumers to access their data profiles and even stop future tracking. Katy Bachman, 
Confessions of a Data Broker: Acxiom’s CEO Scott Howe Explains How Self-Regulation Can 
Work, ADWEEK (Mar. 25, 2014), available at http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/
confessions-data-broker-156437. 
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A centralized government-operated website has many benefits 
over the self-regulation policy adopted by the FTC and seen in 
FACTA. For instance, Experian, in a comment to the FTC,249 
voiced privacy and security concerns regarding a right to access 
and correction of data files, explaining that in order to identify a 
user’s rights, a company engaging in self-regulation will need addi-
tional sensitive PII in order to authenticate a user’s request for da-
ta.250 If the government acts as the trustee and intermediary be-
tween trackers and voters, private companies will not need to 
maintain sensitive records for authentication purposes. Also, many 
commentators maintain that data is not always sold to third-party 
companies with information that could individually identify any 
one person.251 With a centralized hub, the government could verify 
a voter’s identity using sensitive PII (e.g. Social Security number) 
and aggregate all records maintained on that individual across all 
political data companies that track him or her. In cases where the 
data was sold to a third-party broker and later re-identified, such 
information would then be available for the voter when the third-
party broker discloses. Once a voter’s data is disclosed, the portal 
could allow voters to make decisions about future tracking. This 
could come in the form of centralized and user-friendly “do-not-
track” (DNT) mechanisms.252 The FTC has recommended that 
consumer data brokers use DNT mechanisms but has decided 
                                                                                                                            
249 FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at 7 n.32 (citing Comment of Experian). 
250 “One commenter raised concerns about granting access and correction rights to data 
files used to prevent fraudulent activity, noting that such rights would create risks of fraud 
and identity theft. This commenter also stated that companies would need to add 
sensitive identifying information to their marketing databases in order to authenticate a 
consumer’s request for information, and that the integration of multiple databases would 
raise additional privacy and security risks.” Id. at 64. 
251 “[C]ommenter pointed out that many marketers do not maintain records about data 
sold to other companies on an individual basis. Thus, marketers have the ability to 
identify the companies to which they have sold consumer data in general, but not the 
third parties with which they may have shared the information about any individual 
consumer.” Id. at 65. 
252 In order to define DNT, one must first understand what “tracking” entails. 
According to the Center for Democracy and Technology, “tracking” is defined as “the 
collection and correlation of data about the Internet activities of a particular user, 
computer, or device, over time and across non-commonly branded websites, for any 
purpose other than fraud prevention or compliance with law enforcement requests.” 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., WHAT DOES ‘DO NOT TRACK’ MEAN? 3, 5 (Jan. 31, 
2011), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-DNT-Report.pdf. 
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against a legal mandate.253 Instead it issued guidelines and prin-
ciples urging that industry create an “easy to use, persistent, and 
effective Do Not Track system.”254 However, a centralized DNT 
approach may be necessary in order to gain meaningful compliance. 
For example, the European e-Privacy Directive in 2002 mandated 
that users must be given “clear and comprehensive information” 
about data tracking and a right to refuse it.255 This resulted in data 
trackers allowing users to reject cookies if they could find the in-
structions to disable a tracking tool burrowed in a website’s privacy 
policy.256 
2. Regulatory Implementation 
It is not clear if any federal agency currently has the authority 
to implement a centralized transparency and choice portal for polit-
ical data. The FTC could regulate consumer data brokers and 
trackers under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.257 
However, once the consumer data is sold off to a campaign or polit-
ical data firm and matched with voter lists, it is not clear that the 
resulting data would be regulable under the FTC’s Section 5 power 
                                                                                                                            
253 “[T]he FTC will focus its policy efforts … on vigorously [enforcing] existing laws, 
[working] with industry on self-regulation, and [continuing] to target its education efforts 
on building awareness of existing data collection and use practices and the tools to control 
them.” FTC REPORT, supra note 34, at ix. 
254 Id. at v. 
255 Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the 
Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (July 31, 2002), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML. 
“Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store 
information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a 
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is 
provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 
95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to 
refuse such processing by the data controller.” Id. 
256 The European e-Privacy Directive was later amended to call for opt-in consent. 
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or ‘Do Not Track:’ Advancing Transparency and 
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 308 
(2012). 
257 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce are . . . declared unlawful.”). 
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to regulate “commerce.”258 The Federal Election Commission 
may also lack jurisdiction. The agency was created to enforce fed-
eral campaign finance law259 through powers specific to campaign 
finance enforcement.260 When the FEC regulates in novel areas the 
courts have applied heightened scrutiny to the action.261 Regard-
less, the FEC is notorious for gridlock and dysfunction262 and may 
not be a good regulator on that basis alone. 
The FTC would be the best agency to regulate computational 
politics, but doing so will require jurisdictional expansion by Con-
gress. In the past, Congress has expanded the FTC’s jurisdiction to 
enforce privacy under FCRA and COPPA.263 Today, the FTC’s 
small privacy division only enforces COPPA.264 Despite the narrow 
jurisdictional grant, the agency has a good reputation as the de fac-
to federal privacy agency,265 and given the dysfunctional nature of 
the FEC, it would be the best candidate for the job. 
                                                                                                                            
258 Id. The act is only addressed to commercial practices. 
259 “The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate 
policy with respect to, this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of Title 26. The 
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such 
provisions.” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2012). 
260 52 U.S.C. § 30107 (2014). 
261 “This novel extension of the Commission’s investigative authority warrants extra-
careful scrutiny from the court because the activities which the FEC normally investigates 
differ in terms of their constitutional significance from those which are of concern to 
other federal administrative agencies whose authority relates to the regulation of 
corporate, commercial, or labor activities.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Machinists Non-
Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
262 “The chairwoman of the Federal Election Commission says she’s largely given up 
hope of reining in abuses in raising and spending money in the 2016 presidential campaign 
and calls the agency she oversees ‘worse than dysfunctional.’” FEC Chair Ann Ravel Says 
Agency is ‘Worse Than Dysfunctional’ At Regulating Money in Politics, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/03/fec-ann-ravel-
dysfunctional_n_7197360.html; see also Jonathan Backer, Gridlock and Dysfunction on 
Display at FEC Oversight Hearing, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/gridlock-and-dysfunction-display-fec-oversight-
hearing. 
263 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602 (2014). 
264 Id. 
265 “Today, the FTC is viewed as the de facto federal data protection authority. A data 
protection authority is common in the privacy law of most other countries, which 
designate a particular agency to have the power to enforce privacy laws.” Id. at 600. 
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B. State Voter Privacy Protections 
States enjoy broad authority to regulate access to their public 
records.266 In response to the growing data trade, states have im-
plemented some restrictions to public records.267 Often states ex-
clude access for the commercial uses of soliciting business or mar-
keting services or products.268 Because state voter registration data 
is an invaluable resource for political micro-targeters,269 states are 
in a position to condition access to records on implementation of 
basic privacy protections. This could be a useful interim stop-gap 
to mitigate the harms caused by computational politics while Con-
gress is in legislative dysfunction.270 Also, in the interest of national 
uniformity, should Congress choose to legislate in this area, it 
could easily preempt these laws in the same way that FACTA 
preempted state credit data laws.271 
1. State Voter Registration Databases 
In response to the 2000 presidential election and Florida re-
count, Congress passed HAVA,272 mandating improvements to 
outdated election procedures across the states. One such mandate 
was the statewide computerized voter registration list, along with 
uniform procedures for processing registration data.273 In the past, 
voter registration lists were maintained by a patchwork of state and 
local offices with little computerization, standardization, or real-
time access.274 In some cases, access to voter lists required the right 
                                                                                                                            
266 Solove, supra note 64, at 1169. 
267 See id. 
268 Id. 
269 See supra Part I.C. 
270 Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein, Yes, Congress is That Bad, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/. 
271 “Congress chose to permanently extend the preemptions that were established 
under the 1996 reforms to the FCRA and to institute additional preemptions in areas in 
which the states had previously been free to regulate.” Michael Epshteyn, The Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003: Will Preemption of State Credit Reporting Laws 
Harm Consumers?, 93 GEO. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2005). 
272 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012). 
273 Kele Williams, Key Provisions of the Help America Vote Act, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (June 20, 2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/HAVA%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
274 See ISSENBERG, supra note 62, at 245. 
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connections—or a willingness to pay.275 HAVA liberalized access 
by requiring standardized databases, network computing, and real-
time lists accessible by any election official in the state.276 Easily 
accessible and electronic records were a significant boon for parties 
and political data firms.277 Firms like Voter Vault, Catalist, and 
Aristotle rely on data to make their targeting and profiling services 
relevant and up to date,278 and they offer a suite of comprehensive 
national voter lists comprised of state voter lists.279 
2. Conditioning Access to State Voter Databases 
States are in a unique position to require basic data protections 
in exchange for use of voter data. Many states have already imple-
mented prohibitions on the commercial use of voter registration 
records.280 For example, “California [allows] voter registration 
lists [to] be released to candidates, political committees, or for 
‘election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpos-
es.”‘281 However, this likely would not place any restrictions on 
political data firms accessing data.282 States could release voter lists 
on the condition that campaigns and political data firms adopt 
some privacy protections that will minimize harms caused by a loss 
                                                                                                                            
275 “While technically public information, these lists were often jealously controlled by 
local party bosses. To gain access, a candidate had to have the right connections—or be 
willing to pay.” Verini, supra note 55. 
276 Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 
430 (2004). 
277 “As records are increasingly computerized, entire record systems rather than 
individual records can be easily searched, copied, and transferred. Private sector 
organizations sweep up millions of records from record systems throughout the country 
and consolidate those records into gigantic record systems.” Solove, supra note 64, at 
1152; see also Nick Judd, In Year of Political ‘Big Data,’ NationBuilder Makes Voter Data 
Free, TECH PRESIDENT (Sept. 13, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/22856/year-
political-big-data-nationbuilder-makes-voter-data-free; see also Evans, supra note 10, at 
883. 
278 Evans, supra note 10, at 883. 
279 Robert L. Mitchell, Campaign 2012: Mining for Voters, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 29, 
2012), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2492578/big-data/campaign-2012—min
ing-for-voters.html?page=2. 
280 See Howard, supra note 220, at 166. 
281 Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan, Kent Wayland, Campaign Disclosure, 
Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 965 (2011) (quoting CAL. 
ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2)). 
282 Solove, supra note 64, at 1144 n.15 
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of informational autonomy. Regulations could implement FIPs or a 
centralized, state-run transparency and choice portal.283 Or, states 
could require each political data tracker to adopt a DNT mechan-
ism284 or require minimum standards for third-party sharing of vot-
er information and the reporting of data breaches. 
a) Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Voter Data 
Protections 
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment man-
dates a “right of access” to government documents.285 In general, 
the right of access has only been applied to records from criminal 
proceedings. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, the facts involved a Massachusetts law that protected the 
privacy of juvenile victims of sexual assault by closing all criminal 
trial proceedings to the public.286 The Supreme Court held that a 
“major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.”287 To determine whether the 
right of access applies, the Court delivered a two-prong test: (1) 
examine whether the record has “historically . . . been open to the 
press and general public;” (2) determine whether access “plays a 
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole.”288 Lower courts today 
typically apply the Globe Newspaper two-prong test.289  
The Court has not squarely articulated whether the right of 
access applies to other state documents and proceedings.290 How-
ever, that is no guarantee that the Globe Newspaper test does not 
extended to other state records.291 Because the right of access di-
rectly implicates the right to knowledge about the government as 
                                                                                                                            
283 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
284 Id. 
285 Solove, supra note 64, at 1201 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980)). 
286 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982). 
287 Id. at 604 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
288 Solove, supra note 64, at 1201 (2002) (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605). 
289 See El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 
147, 149 (1993) (applying the Globe Newspaper test); see also United States v. Index 
Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2014); Solove, supra note 64, at 1202. 
290 Solove, supra note 64, at 1203. 
291 Id. 
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an essential component of discourse,292 the doctrine could easily 
apply to state voter records. Therefore, in order to survive the 
Globe Newspaper test, a state law that limits access to voter data will 
need to be narrowly tailored to apply to particular uses293 and arti-
culate a compelling governmental interest.294 
Protecting a voter’s informational privacy could be a compel-
ling governmental interest. The Constitution requires certain re-
sponsibilities for the way the government uses the information it 
collects.295 In Whalen v. Roe, the Court extended the right to priva-
cy296 to include personal information collected by the govern-
ment.297 At issue in Whalen was whether New York State was per-
mitted to record, in a centralized computer database, all of the 
names and addresses of persons who have been prescribed certain 
drugs.298 The plaintiffs argued that the collection and aggregation 
of personal information on its face violated their right to privacy,299 
but the Court disagreed.300 However, the Court did clearly articu-
late that the “zone of privacy” extends to both decisional privacy, 
defined as “independence in making certain kinds of important de-
cisions,”301 and informational privacy, defined as “individual in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”302 The Court 
emphasized that accumulation of vast amounts of personal infor-
mation in government computerized databases can be a clear threat 
to an individual’s privacy.303 As a result, states that engage in col-
lection and aggregation of personal information are obligated to 
avoid embarrassing, harmful, and unwarranted disclosures.304 Al-





296 Id. at 1204–05. 
297 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
298 Id. at 591. 
299 “Appellees contend that the statute invades a constitutionally protected ‘zone of 
privacy.’” Id. at 598. 
300 Id. at 600. 
301 Id. at 599–600. 
302 Id. at 599. 
303 Id. at 605. 
304 “The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied 
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.” Id. 
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though a majority of the circuit courts have now accepted the con-
stitutional right to informational privacy,305 the right has not devel-
oped much since Whalen.306  
However, if a state’s voter data limitations are too burdensome, 
they may potentially be struck down as a violation of the right to 
vote.307 In order to determine if a state law is too burdensome on 
the right to vote, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing test, 
weighing “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury” 
against “the precise interests put forward by the State” while con-
sidering “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights.”308 The Court has explicitly rejected 
strict scrutiny;309 instead, it has accepted “reasonable, nondiscri-
minatory restrictions” as constitutional if the state demonstrates 
an “important regulatory interest.”310  
States can balance the rights of access and privacy in crafting 
appropriate voter data protections. As discussed earlier, computa-
tional politics can harm a voter’s informational privacy, autonomy, 
and self-determination.311 As seen in Whalen, protecting a citizen’s 
informational privacy can be a valid constitutional prerogative for 
states. Burdens on the right to vote aside, a state can constitutional-
ly limit access to voter records in exchange for privacy protections. 
Overall, a state voter data protection regime will have to balance 
three constitutional interests: (1) the right to access information 
that plays a significant role in the function of the government; (2) 
                                                                                                                            
305 Solove, supra note 64, at 1205 n.413. 
306 Id. 
307 The Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence has located the right to vote in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. “The Supreme Court has identified various rights as 
fundamental based on their importance to ensuring individual liberty and self-
governance …. These rights include the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to 
interstate travel, and, supposedly, the right to vote.” Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to 
Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 147–48 (2008). 
308 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). 
309 “Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters. Each 
provision of a code, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at 
least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others 
for political ends.” Id. at 433. 
310 Id. at 434. 
311 See supra Parts II.C.1–3. 
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the right of citizens to be free from harm caused by the dissemina-
tion of public records that contain their personal information; (3) 
the right to be free from unreasonable and discriminatory restric-
tions on the right to vote. 
b) Federal Statutory Limitations on State Voter Data 
Protections 
Limitations on voter list access will not likely run afoul of fed-
eral statutory protections. Burdens on the constitutional right to 
vote aside,312 states enjoy broad power to regulate the time, place, 
and manner of elections313—which includes the registration and 
qualifications of voters.314 However, the federal government may 
proscribe this authority with new law,315 and it has frequently done 
so. Laws like the Voting Rights Act (VRA),316 HAVA,317 and the 
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)318 all limit state authority 
to legislate in this area.  
Most relevant for our purposes are the NVRA’s requirements 
that states disclose materials used to produce voter lists. In part, 
the NVRA requires that states make available for public inspection 
“all records concerning the implementation of programs and activ-
ities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and cur-
rency of official lists of eligible voters.”319 Whether this provision 
applies to voter lists comprised of active voters—the kind of data 
sold to campaigns and political data firms320—was addressed in 
True the Vote v. Hosemann321 during the 2014 midterm elections. 
 
True the Vote involved a run-off election in the Mississippi Re-
publican primary for U.S. Senate. A tea party challenger appeared 
                                                                                                                            
312 See supra Part IV.B.2.a 
313 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
314 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). 
315 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
316 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014). 
317 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2006). 
318 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–11 (2005). 
319 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) (2006). 
320 See supra Part I.B. 
321 No. 3:14-CV-532-NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014). 
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poised to unseat Thad Cochran in the run-off.322 However, Senator 
Cochran maintained his seat by a few thousand votes with the help 
of predominantly African-American Democratic crossover votes.323 
Suspicious of voter fraud, True the Vote (TTV), a Texas-based 
conservative voter integrity group, sought to inspect Mississippi’s 
election records,324 including active voter lists.325 Mississippi law 
confines inspection of cast ballots to candidates and representa-
tives, but makes no mention of other election materials.326 Without 
clear statutory authority, Mississippi’s officials refused TTV 
access in most cases.327 TTV sued Mississippi under the “public 
disclosure” provision of the NVRA to gain access and lost.328 The 
district court’s opinion in part found that the NVRA did not apply 
to voter lists containing active voters.329 The court in Project 
Vote/Voting for America v. Long noted that the NVRA’s plain mean-
ing and statutory purpose only required disclosure of materials re-
levant to the carrying out of voter registration activities because 
they are “the means by which an individual provides the informa-
tion necessary for the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to 
vote.”330 Lists of active voters are not used for maintaining accu-
rate official lists of voters because “[w]hether a voter in ‘active’ 
                                                                                                                            
322 Rebecca Green, Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 822–
23 (2014). 
323 Nate Cohn & Derek Willis, More Evidence That Thad Cochran Owes Runoff Win to 
Black Voters, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/
upshot/more-evidence-that-thad-cochran-owes-runoff-win-to-black-voters.html. 
324 Emily Wagster Pettus, US Judge: Voters’ Birthdates Are Not Public Record, WASH. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/2/us-judge-
voters-birthdates-are-not-public-record/. 
325 Id. 
326 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-271(1) (2012) (“The state executive committee of any 
political party authorized to conduct political party primaries shall form an election 
integrity assurance committee for each congressional district.”). 
327 “When TTV representatives sought access to election materials at county election 
clerks’ offices, they were met with mixed results. Some counties denied TTV access 
altogether.” Green, supra note 322, at 824. 
328 True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14-CV-532-NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *1 (S.D. 
Miss. Aug. 29, 2014). 
329 Id. at *17. 
330 682 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 
752 F.Supp.2d 697, 707 (E.D. Va. 2010)). 
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status voted or failed to vote in a particular election does not affect 
that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.”331 
True the Vote is instructive as to whether the NVRA will 
preempt state voter data protection laws that limit access to lists of 
voters. The district court’s opinion suggests that a state could limit 
or even deny access to voter data, so long as the data is not relevant 
to a state’s list maintenance procedures.332 Whether a state’s data 
is used for list maintenance appears to be factually determined.333 
So long as a state limits or gives conditional access to pure lists of 
registered voters that can vote on Election Day, there will not likely 
be an NVRA problem. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Computational politics has grown in lockstep with “Big Data” 
practices seen in advertising and commercial industries that track 
individuals online and offline with increasing efficiency and effec-
tiveness. As a result, campaigns and the firms they hire are now in 
possession of a massive trove of PII on hundreds of millions of 
American voters. In the absence of regulatory oversight, these da-
tabases and the tools used to assemble them can harm a voter’s in-
formational privacy by allowing campaigns to craft substantial in-
formational asymmetries that make it difficult for voters to predict 
                                                                                                                            
331 “Voter statuses do not change as a result of the State’s processing of poll books. 
Whether a voter in ‘active’ status voted or failed to vote in a particular election does not 
affect that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.” True the Vote, 2014 WL 4273332, 
at *17. 
332 “Thus, to be subject to disclosure under the NVRA, a record must ultimately 
concern activities geared towards ensuring that a State’s official list of voters is errorless 
and up-to-date.” True the Vote, 2014 WL 4273332, at *14; see also Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 
336 (“The requested applications are relevant to carrying out voter registration activities 
because they are the means by which an individual provides the information necessary for 
the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to vote.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
333 See, e.g., Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 336 (“[T]he registration applications requested by 
Project Vote are clearly ‘records concerning the implementation of’ this ‘program and 
activit[y]’ . . . because they are ‘the means by which an individual provides the 
information necessary for the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to vote’ . . . 
[w]ithout verification of an applicant’s citizenship, age, and other necessary information 
provided by registration applications, state officials would be unable to determine whether 
that applicant meets the statutory requirements for inclusion in official voting lists.”). 
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when they are being tracked, who is tracking them, and which in-
formation has been gathered. This can create serious harms to pri-
vacy and democracy in the form of discrimination, redlining, chill-
ing effects on political association, and unaccountable black boxes. 
 
Adopting FIPs and expanding the FTC’s jurisdiction to expli-
citly include political data can minimize these harms. Once given 
the jurisdictional grant, the FTC can require campaigns and the 
political data firms they employ to disclose their data at a one-stop-
shop web portal designed to disclose what data campaigns have on 
voters and allow voters to initiate a DNT mechanism. States are 
also free to craft voter data protection laws due to the immense 
power they wield in administering and maintaining official lists of 
voters. When political campaigns and political data firms purchase 
these lists, the states can condition use on adoption of FIPs or a 
web portal that discloses data and offers a DNT mechanism. 
Whether states may freely regulate access to their voter lists will 
depend on federal constitutional and statutory concerns that could 
prevent the state from regulating in this area. Overall, states are 
likely not to run afoul of the federal constitution or laws if their 
regulations foster transparency and choice and do not implement 
outright bans on particular uses of political data. 
